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Abstract
Improved control of agency is likely to be a prior and more important function of 
episodic memory than the epistemic-communicative role pinpointed by Mahr and 
Csibra. Taking the memory trace upon which scenario construction is based to be a 
stored internal model produced in past perceptual processing promises to provide a 
better account of autonoetic character than metarepresentational embedding.
Mahr and Csibra (2018) argue that the proper function of episodic memory is to 
support epistemic authority in communication. While this is really an 
evolutionary claim, they explicitly eschew historical evidence and instead present 
the claim as an inference from design features. This is an accepted strategy, though 
one which can misÞre in ÔspandrelÕ cases, where some trait developed for another 
function or simply as a by-product becomes available for further purposes (Gould 
& Lewontin, 1979). In this case the MahrÐCsibra functional hypothesis has 
consequences which may well be considered surprising: that episodic memory has 
a relatively short evolutionary history and is exclusively human.
We are sceptical that a major cognitive capacity will have one single function. In 
general, there are likely to be many Þtness-relevant functions for any cognitive 
adaptation. Mahr and Csibra are right to claim that episodic memory plays an 
epistemic role that is useful in social interaction. But it is not clear what pressing 
adaptive problem this function helps to solve. Contrast the MahrÐCsibra 
hypothesis with the proposal of a cheater detection module (Cosmides, 1989; 
Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). Those engaging in social contracts need to defend 
themselves against exploitation by free riders. But how do those engaging in 
communication beneÞt from such authority as episodic memory confers upon 
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beliefs? If anything, hearers will have to exert greater vigilance to guard against the 
more cunning deceptions that can be supported by claims to have seen or heard 
something. Admittedly, speakers may communicate more conÞdently given the 
source knowledge incorporated in episodic memory. But such source knowledge is 
epistemically supportive in relation to the subjectÕs own beliefs, whether 
communicated or not. Did I leave the house secure? Yes, I can remember how it 
looked and felt to turn the key in the lock, so I did. That sort of inference is surely 
adaptively valuable.
We think there is a strong case for holding that a prior function of episodic 
memory is the fact that autonoetic recall enables experience to improve an agentÕs 
control of his or her actions. One remembers seeing and hearing, which is different 
from remembering that one saw or heard, since the autonoetic character represents 
the perspective of a perceptual agent. One also remembers doing things and what 
that felt like, and how successful the action was. Could anyone become a skilled 
hunter without episodic memory? While practice may improve proÞciency in 
simple skills merely in terms of acquiring dexterity and strength (through 
procedural memory), improvement in any innovative technique requires 
experience to enhance future performance in a more ßexible way, through episodic 
memory of previous attempts and their outcomes. Just as a driver (without 
satellite navigation) relies on episodic memory to retrace a once travelled but 
unfamiliar route, our ancestors needed to remember the path through a forest, 
recalling dangers previously met and now to be avoided. The special salience 
given to memories by social emotions bears witness to the adaptive advantage 
episodic memory gives in social interaction: remembering occasions when one 
was shamed or embarrassed helps to avoid their recurrence.
What happens when an agent draws on episodic recollection, in the exercise of a 
complex skill, in the recall of a past event, or for that matter in the social-
communicative situations which Mahr and Csibra highlight? We suggest that he 
or she has recourse to stored internal models (Wolpert et al., 1995; Wolpert et al., 
1998; Petro & Muckli, 2016) of previous actions, which represent the agent in his or 
her interactions with the environment from the agentÕs point of view. The stored 
internal model is the memory trace which is embellished by a process of scenario 
construction. Is combining a source-tag with scenario construction and in addition 
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embedding the content within metarepresentation (Mahr and CsibraÕs Ôdistinctive 
epistemic attitudeÕ) sufÞcient to account for autonoesis? We think not. Mahr and 
Csibra are right that autonoesis is a generative source of knowledge about the 
personal past. But if that is so, then the metarepresentation of propositional 
content Ð which they seem to claim is the root of the autonoetic character of 
episodic recollection Ð is not the origin of, but derived from that source. Autonoesis is 
built in from the start, rather than being added by metarepresentation. Thus, we 
are puzzled by the way Mahr and Csibra distinguish episodic from ÔeventÕ 
memory, in that this seems no mere distinction between ÔactorÕ and ÔspectatorÕ 
memory, but between remembering with and without autonoesis. Even spectating, 
however, involves a particular point of view that matches the autonoetic character 
of later recollection. As for actions involving a deliberate intervention in an 
organismÕs environment, these are made possible by an organism representing 
itself in relation to environmental features. It is no surprise, then, that autonoetic 
self-representation should also be part of later episodic recollections. This applies 
to oneÕs remembering locking the front door; it may even apply to a scrub jay 
remembering caching food (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998).
Given that the function of internal models is to Þne-tune and successfully 
complete actions, it is more than plausible that reactivating a stored internal model 
will facilitate successful replication and provide a check on successful completion. 
Now that we realize the extent to which the brain is a predictive machine (Clark, 
2013; 2014), we should acknowledge that the nature and representational format of 
the internal model depends upon the two-way ßow of perceptual processing. 
Thinking of the memory trace as merely stored information is a relic of the 
armchair take on perception, whether as passive imprinting or as bottom-up input 
computation. Given that the percipient is not just spectating, but also running, 
scrambling, and grappling, the internal models generated and corrected in 
perceptual experience operate to tune the agent for interaction with his or her 
environment. One consequence of this attunement is episodic memory, then 
available for replicating actions, as well as social-communicative purposes, which 
recycle a capacity already there. So in our view Mahr and CsibraÕs 
metarepresentational embedding of episodic content really relates to our ability to 
report on our autonoetic recollections.
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